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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
000O000

SHERMAN D. PACKER,

:
REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

Plaintiff,

:

v.
NATIONAL SERVICE INDUSTRIES,
INC., a Delaware corporation;
B.W. NORTON MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, INC., a California
corporation; and INTERNATIONAL
MACHINE AND TOOL WORKS, INC.,

:
: Case No. 950121-CA
:

Priority No. 15

:

an Illinois corporation,
Defendants.

:
000O000

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT

I:

Abuse of discretion is the standard of review for

considering a late-filed memorandum and the trial court did not
abuse

its discretion when it, for good cause, considered

the

memorandum.
POINT II:
standing

NSI had standing under Utah Law.
law which

is based on

Norton cites federal

'case or controversy'.

Utah

standing law is distinct from federal law and standing requirements
are met by NSI.

POINT III:

The courts apply different standards to "containers"

versus "component parts."

A factual question exists as to whether

Norton's pail and lid were a "container" or "component parts."
This

alone prevents a grant of summary judgment by the lower

court.
POINT IV:
question

The evidence before the lower court raised a factual
about

whether

the

product

Norton

manufactured

was

defective and therefore a grant of summary judgment was improper.
POINT V:

The container manufactured by Norton not only had the

foreseeable use to hold liquids but it was intended for just such
use.
ARGUMENT
Each of the following points directly corresponds to points in
the brief of the appellee.
POINT I:

THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ABUSE
CONSIDERING A LATE-FILED RESPONSE.

ITS

DISCRETION

IN

Norton claims the lower court must grant Norton's motion, as
unopposed, because the opposing memorandum was late.
A. The proper standard of review is abuse of discretion.
Norton

claims

that

the

lower

court

decided

all

issues,

including this one, as a matter of law and that the trial court's
2

consideration of the late-filed memorandum should be reviewed for
"correctness."
lower

court

(Norton brief at p. 2)
has

discretion

to

That is incorrect.

consider

a

wide

variety

The
of

information in its decision, including, for good cause, a latefiled memorandum.

This Court should overturn the lower court, only

if the lower court's discretion is abused.

Arevalo

of Emp. See,

Under Norton's theory,

745 P.2d 847 (Ct. App. 1987).

v.

Department

any late memorandum opposing a motion would result in an automatic
default.
B.

The lower court's discretion was not abused.
Norton's

motion

was

filed

against

plaintiff's counsel stated he would oppose it.

the

plaintiff

and

Plaintiff's counsel

obtained an extension of time to file the opposing memorandum. Only
when plaintiff's counsel declined at the last minute to file an
opposing memorandum did co-defendant NSI file one.

It was several

days past the extended time, and several weeks past the original
deadline.

Plaintiff urged the Court to consider NSI's brief,

feeling responsible for having stated he would file a response, and
then not filing one.

The Court considered the case on the merits,

over Norton's objection.

3

The Court's agreement to consider the late-filed memorandum
was not an abuse of discretion.

It looked at all the facts

surrounding the late filing, determined it was not jurisdictional
but procedural, and for good cause considered the memorandum of
defendant

NSI.

It

was

the

appropriate

decision

under

the

circumstances.
POINT II: NSI HAS STANDING.
In Point II of its brief, Norton claims NSI does not have
standing to pursue this appeal.

In support of its contention,

Norton cites three federal cases.

The federal cases are irrelevant

to standing in Utah state courts.
Terracor
1986)
Terracor,

is the

v. Utah

Board

landmark

of

State

Lands,

case on standing

716 P.2d 796
in Utah

(Utah

courts.

In

the Supreme Court of Utah stated "unlike federal law

where standing doctrine is related to the 'case or controversy'
language of Article III of the United States Constitution, our
standing law arises from the general precepts of the Doctrine of
Separation of Powers found in Article V of the Utah Constitution."
Terracor,

supra

at 798 (emphasis added) .

federal law, Terracor

Instead of looking to

lays out the basis of standing in Utah.

4

Terracor
courts.
that

the

first addresses the underpinnings of standing in Utah

The parties need "a sufficient interest" in the dispute
issues will

be

"thoroughly

explored."

Standing

is

intended to assure that the Court deals with "crystallized disputes
concerning specific factual situations."

Because of this, it is

generally required ". . . that a litigant have a personal stake in
the outcome of the specific dispute."
depends on the facts of each case."

Standing

See Terracor,

".

. . often

Supra

at 798,

799.
Terracor

laid out three criteria, any one of which may give a

litigant standing.
A.

These three are addressed below:

Personal stake in litigation constitutes standing.
"Plaintiff must be able to show that he has suffered some

distinct and palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in the
Terracor,

outcome of the legal dispute."

Supra

clearly meets that criteria in the present suit.

at 799.

NSI

NSI had the right

for a jury to determine Norton's fault.1 NSI's right was abrogated

ln

The trial court . . . shall, direct the jury, if any, to find
separate special verdicts determining the total amount . . . of
fault attributable to each . . . defendant," Utah Code Ann. §7827-39. "Defendant means a person . . . who is claimed to be liable
because of fault to any person seeking recovery." (Utah Code Anno.
5

when plaintiff declined to resist Norton's Motion for Summary
Judgment, and the Court ruled that Norton's name would not be
included on the jury verdict form.
The real basis of this appeal is the lower court's ruling that
Norton's fault would not be determined.

In the lower court, NSI

maintained that it did not object to Norton receiving summary
judgment, as long as Norton's fault was determined by the jury.
(R. p. 281, 1. 5 ) . Under Sullivan

v.

Scoular

Grain,

853 P.2d 877,

a party who is not at fault, as a matter of law, does not have its
fault determined by the jury.

This case, however, is similar to a

party being dismissed for failure to prosecute.

The plaintiff

never even filed an opposition to Norton's motion for summary
judgment, evidently realizing that, as long as the Court would not
allow

Norton's

name

on

the

jury verdict,

it was

easier

for

plaintiff to prosecute the case against one defendant, NSI. (See
brief of appellant, p. 41)
When the Court ruled Norton's fault would not be determined by
the jury, a critical interest of NSI was affected.

§78-27-37(1)).
6

Fault on a jury

verdict must equal 100%, and NSI would end up paying for Norton's
proportionate fault.
NSI settled when it became obvious that expert and attorney's
fees would
plaintiff

likely exceed the proposed
to

pursue

an

appeal

against

settlement.
Norton,

declined, maintaining the Court had already ruled.
six figure

but

NSI urged
plaintiff

NSI has paid a

settlement, and wants Norton's proportionate

fault

determined, maintaining that most or all of the fault is Norton's.
This is clearly a 'crystallized dispute concerning a specific
factual

situation'

with NSI

outcome' as required by
B.

having

a

'personal

stake

in the

Terracor.

Greatest Interest in case constitutes standing.
A second alternative basis of standing is when n . . . n o one

else has a greater interest in the outcome of the case and the
issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless that particular
plaintiff has standing to raise the issue."

(Terracor,

799) NSI also has standing under this criteria.

Supra

at

The plaintiff

below has settled, and agreed to assist NSI in pursuing the case
against Norton (See Addendum 1, the settlement agreement).

These

issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless NSI has standing.

7

Norton's federal theory of standing would compel NSI to 1) try the
case no matter how reasonable a settlement is offered in order to
preserve standing; and 2) make cross claims compulsory, although
under the Utah rules of civil procedure cross claims are clearly
permissive.2

NSI has the greatest interest in the outcome of this

case and these issues will not be addressed otherwise.
C.

Unique issues of public interest constitute standing.
A third criteria which will grant standing is ". . . i f the

issues are unique and of such great public importance that they
ought

to be

decided

in furtherance

2

of

the public

interest."

Cross claims are clearly permissive, not compulsory.
Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 13(f) governs "Cross-claim against coparty." It states "A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim
by one party against a co-party . . . such cross-claim may include
a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be
liable to the cross claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in
the action against the cross claimant" (emphasis added). The rule
clearly states that cross claims "may" be brought.
This rule
contrasts with rule
13 (a) which is entitled
"Compulsory
counterclaims", which uses the word "shall" instead of "may."
Moore's Federal Practice (the Federal and State rules on cross
claims are the same) states "The subdivision [on cross claims],
though reading much like subdivision (a) concerning compulsory
counterclaim, is permissive: the claim may, but need not, be
pleaded."
Moore's Federal Practice §13.34[1].
(Emphasis in
original). Since a cross claim is permissive, it is not waived if
not filed in the original suit.
(See Norton's motion and NSI's
response, Addendum 2 and 3.)
8

Terracor,

Supra

requirement.

at

799.

The

present

case

also

meets

this

Under Norton's theory, the Tort Reform Act has

allowed a plaintiff, as NSI maintains occurred in this case, to
select one of multiple defendants against which to prosecute a
case.

That defendant can be chosen because of a more simple case,

easier access to witnesses or any other criteria.

Plaintiff can

then allow the other defendants to bring motions

for summary

judgment, which plaintiff declines to resist, as occurred here.
Norton maintains, and the lower court ruled, that such a dismissal
is

"on the merits" and precludes the defendant's

proportioned

by

the

jury.

This

Court

should

fault being
consider

the

alternatives to this unfairness to further the public interest in
future cases.
Norton ignores Utah's standing law because it grants NSI
standing.

The underlying basis of a "personal stake" in the

outcome of a "specific factual situation" is met here.
instead

cites

underpinnings.

federal

law,

based

on

entirely

Norton

different

The federal law is irrelevant to this case.

has standing under the criteria set forth in

9

Terracor.

NSI

POINT III:

THERE IS, AT LEAST, A FACTUAL QUESTION AS TO
WHETHER NORTON'S PAIL AND LID WERE "COMPONENT
PARTS."

Norton argues that "The lower court correctly held that Norton
manufactured only 'component parts' with which containers could be
assembled."

(Norton brief at p. 9)

A. A factual question exists, at least, as to whether Norton's two
products, a pail and a lid, were "component parts" or a
"container."
"Norton did not sell a 'container' to NSIf but components with
which NSI constructed a container."

(Norton brief at p. 11).

Norton's "component parts" consisted of two items, a pail and a lid
which Norton had manufactured

specifically

to

seal

the pail.

Norton claims these are "component parts", a term of art referring
to an inconsequential component which is unforeseeably incorporated
into

a

much

more

complex

piece

of

machinery,

designed

and

manufactured by another.
Norton tries to distinguish NSI's "container" cases, cited in
the appellant's brief, by claiming they do not address "component
part" law.
parts."

Of course the container cases do not discuss "component

Neither do they address statute of limitations or other

law that is not relevant to the case.

10

What they do address is

"container" law.

A manufacturer of a container, including Norton,

is liable for the foreseeable uses of its container.

Here, NSI's

use of Norton's container to ship soap was not only foreseeable, it
was anticipated.
Van Duzer

v. Shoshone

Coca Cola Bottling,

714 P.2d 812 (Nev.

1987) overruled a jury verdict for the defendant and found, as a
matter of law, that U A product container that cannot withstand the
rigors of normal shipping practices is unreasonably dangerous and,
by definition, defective."

Id.,

at 813.

The same should be said

for Norton's container which could not withstand normal opening
practices in foreseeable elevations and temperatures.
Norton claims That ". . . Van Duzer involved a glass Canada Dry
Bottle not constructed of any component parts" (Norton Brief at
The Court can take judicial notice that Van Duzer

11) .

involved a container and a lid.

also

If the container manufacturer

sealed the lid in place, there would be no means of inserting the
contents into the container.
Norton's

attempts

to

distinguish

the

container

cases

referenced by NSI, are conclusory - not based on differences in the
cases.

Norton's container and lid are clearly analogous to the

11

"container" cases, and are not the "component parts", incorporated
into an unforeseeable product, as the lower court ruled.
POINT IV: THERE IS A FACTUAL QUESTION, AT LEAST, AS TO WHETHER
NORTON'S CONTAINER WAS DEFECTIVE.
Norton claims NSI has misconstrued the lower court's ruling
that

" . . . Norton did not have a duty to Warn." (Summary Judgment

at p. 4,

Paragraph

1).

Norton

argues:

"Rather, the

court

correctly held that Norton's components in fact were not defective,
and Norton therefore had no duty to warn plaintiff of dangers which
might arise through another company's use of its components."
(Norton Brief at 12)
This section of Norton's brief, like others, is dependant on
the correctness of Norton's claim of being a "component part"
manufacturer.

If Norton is not, as a matter of law, a "component

parts" manufacture, the lower court's ruling regarding Norton's
duty and whether the container was defective, however construed,
also fails.
Norton
appellant

has

brief.

ignored

the

factual

NSI's appellant

discussed, with citations:

12

issues

raised

brief, on pages

in

NSI's

28 to 35,

1.

That whether a defendant has breached a duty is ordinarily

"a question of fact for the jury" (See brief of appellant at p.
28) ;
2.

That

the

plaintiff

created

a

factual

issue

of

defectiveness when he testified that he followed the "pry out"
instructions imprinted on Norton's container before it was shipped
to NSI (See brief of appellant at p. 29);
3.

That

Dr.

de

Nevers

created

a

factual

question

of

defectiveness when he testified that the pressure in Norton's
container could propel Norton's seal at up to 160 mph, and that
NSI's soap did not create the pressure in Norton's container, but
was created by normal altitude and temperature differences (See
brief of appellant at pp. 3 0-32);
4.

That

defectiveness

Norton's

owner

created

when he acknowledged

a

factual

he was aware

question
altitude

of
and

temperature differences would create pressure in Norton containers
(See brief of appellant at p. 23); and
5.

That

Dr.

Fineman

created

a

factual

question

of

defectiveness when he testified that ". . . as a chemist . . .

13

there is no basis what-so-ever

for pressure build up in this

product" (See brief of appellant at p. 34).
These

facts

raised

responded to by Norton.3

by NSI

in appellant's

brief

are

not

Norton ignores those facts and instead

cites the lower court's conclusory language that no expert stated
the container was "defective," and that Norton ". . . did not
manufacture the container. . . . " but only its "component parts."
This circuitous reasoning does not avoid the factual issues created
by witnesses,

and

cited

in NSI's

appellant's

brief.

Norton

erroneously tries to avoid the factual testimony in the case by
claiming

no duty because

container.

it was not

the manufacturer

of

the

Summary judgment, an unusual and harsh remedy, is

simply wrong.
POINT V:

NORTON IS NOT A "COMPONENT PARTS'' MANUFACTURER.

In Point V., Norton returns to its central claim, that it had
no duty as a "component part" manufacturer.

3

Norton discusses the Court's holding that Norton's container
was not defective on pages 12 and 13 of appellee's brief.
14

Norton claims it ". . . had no duty to anticipate how its component
parts might be assembled by others into final products . . . ."
(Norton Brief p. 14).
The key to whether a product is a "component part" is whether
its use is foreseeable.

Norton's claim that, as a matter of law,

it could not foresee that Norton's container, shipped to NSI with
a Norton lid, would be filled with a liquid and the lid sealed to
the container, defy all logic.
Sperry

v.

Bauermeister,

Inc.,

Norton's claim of similarity with
786 F.Supp. 1512 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (a

small airlock incorporated into a milling system which was designed
and manufactured by another company) and Miller
Nemours,

v. E.I.

DuPont

de

811 F.Supp. 1286 (E.D. Tenn. 1992) (A Du Pont fiber that

was combined with other ingredients in a patented process, to make
a replacement

joint for the human body) is clearly misplaced.

Norton designed and manufactured its container and lid with the
specific intent they be used, together, to hold liquids.

(See

Statement of Facts, NSI appellant brief, Page 8-9, facts 1-5).
Norton designed and manufactured a container and lid that were
being used for their intended purpose.

Norton tries to escape a

determination of its fault by a jury in claiming, as a matter of

15

law, that it had no duty to anticipate how its container and lid
might be used.

That itself is a factual issue.

Under these

circumstances it is clear that Norton manufactured a container and
a trial is necessary to determine Norton's fault.
CONCLUSION
The lower court erred in applying, as a matter of law, the
"component parts" law to Norton's container.

NSI's use of the

container, as a container, was not only foreseeable to Norton, but
anticipated.
This

case

should

be

remanded

to

the

lower

determination of Norton's fault because either
improperly

granted

the

summary

judgment;

and/or

DATED this 26th day of June, 1995.
POWELL & LANG, LC

16

for a

a) the lower court

declined to resist the motion in good faith.

Todd S. Wii^egar
Wade S. Winegar

court

v

b)

plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 26th day of June, 1995 I mailed
a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following:

Paul M. Belnap
Robert L. Janicki
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for the defendant/appellee
B.W. Norton Manufacturing
Sixth Floor Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

\,XJ , $
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ADDENDUM 1

RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS
For and in consideration of the payment to the undersigned of
the total sum of One Hundred Twelve Thousand Dollars ($112,000.00),
receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned, Sherman
D. Packer, hereby forever releases and discharges National Service
Industries, Inc., ZEP Manufacturing Company, their related
companies, employees, agents, and assigns (the "Releasees"), from
any and all claims, demands, benefits either past or future, causes
of action both for property damages, bodily injuries, contribution
and indemnity, damages, costs, loss of services, expenses, or
compensation in any form on account of, in any way arising out of,
or related to the incident which occurred on or about the 10th day
of June, 1991, at Sandy, Utah, except as noted in the penultimate
paragraph of this release.
The undersigned hereby declares and represents that the
injuries sustained by him are or may be permanent and progressive
and that recovery therefrom may be uncertain and indefinite and in
making this release and agreement it is understood and agreed that
the undersigned relies wholly upon his own judgment, belief and
knov/ledge of the nature, extent and duration of said injuries, and
in granting this complete release, he does not rely upon anything
told him or represented to him by the persons, firms or
corporations who are being released, or by any person representing
them.
Particularly, the undersigned releases the persons and
companies referred to above from the cause of action as set forth
in the certain complaint on file in the Third District Court for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, wherein Sherman D. Packer is
plaintiff and National Service Industries, Inc., a Delaware
corporation, and others, are defendants, Civil No. 920902466CV.
The undersigned hereby consents to stipulate to a dismissal with
prejudice upon the merits of the above named action as against
National Service Industries and ZEP Manufacturing Company only, and
hereby authorizes his counsel to enter into such stipulation of
dismissal.
The undersigned understands and agrees that this settlement is
a compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim and that payment is
not to be construed as an admission of liability on the part of the
persons or companies referred to above who are released herein and
by whom liability is expressly denied.
The undersigned further acknowledges and accepts the advice of
counsel in the settlement of this matter and acknowledges that this
is a full, complete and final release of the releasees for any
matter or thing done or alleged to have been done as a result of
the incident referred to above whether or not now known, claimed or
suspected by the undersigned. The undersigned further represents
that he has not sold or assigned any portion of his claim against
releasees and agrees that if any claim related to this incident
should be made, including claims for indemnity or contribution, the
undersigned will defend, indemnify and save harmless the parties
being released herein. The undersigned represents that there are

no liens on any of the proceeds of this settlement, that all
medicals and other special damages have been paid in full, without
possibility of lien or subrogation. The undersigned covenants that
he will not maintain or prosecute any action or other proceeding,
whether by way of complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third-party
claim, or otherwise, against the releasees which are based upon or
arise out of any facts, acts or omissions occurring or existing at
any time up until the date of this release, whether the claim is
based on contract, tort, statute, contribution, indemnity, equity
or otherwise, and that this release may be plead as a full and
complete defense to any such action or suit arising out of the June
10, 1991, incident.
This release covers all of the undersigned's costs, expenses,
and attorney's fees and this release constitutes the entire
agreement between the parties and the undersigned waives any right
he may have to refer to extrinsic matters in the interpretation
hereof whether to establish fraud, duress, mistake, undue influence
or for any other purpose.
As part of the consideration for this settlement, plaintiff
agrees to cooperate with releasees in pursuing claims against other
parties, including the other named defendants in the above case,
which parties are not released by this document. All claims will
be pursued at the sole expense of the releasees, and ail settlement
or judgment proceeds will belong to releasees, the plaintiff having
been fully compensated for his loss. The undersigned agrees to
cooperate fully, including being deposed, assigning any claims or
proceeds, signing settlement documents and releases, meeting with
counsel and otherwise assisting in pursuing any claims related to
plaintiffs injury.
The undersigned represents that he has carefully read the
foregoing release of all claims, knows the contents thereof and
signs the same by his own free act hereby binding himself, his
heirs, executors, administrators, representatives, and assigns.
DATED this

V

aay of

Xfl/\

, 1994.

Sherman D. Packer
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ADDENDUM 2

RECEIVED
APR ? b m$
Powell & Ung, LC
Paul M. Belnap, #0279
Robert L. Janicki, #5493
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
B.W. Norton Manufacturing Co,
Sixth Floor Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
NATIONAL SERVICE INDUSTRIES,
INC. ,

DEFENDANT B.W. NORTON'S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
vs .
B.W. NORTON MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, INC., a California
corporation; and INTERNATIONAL
MACHINE AND TOOL WORKS, INC.,

Civil No. 950900951CV
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants.
Defendant B.W. Norton Manufacturing Company ("B.W. Norton"),
by and through counsel of record, hereby submits the following
memorandum of points and authorities in support of its motion to
dismiss.
FACTS
1.

The instant action filed by plaintiff National Service

Industries, Inc. (NSI) arises out of a prior lawsuit filed by
Sherman D. Packer ("Packer") v. NSI, B.W. Norton, and International
.'OW.Unh

Machine and Tool Works ("International").
hereto as Exhibit A.]

[See Complaint attached

Defendants NSI and B.W. Norton answered and

defended the allegations asserted by Mr. Packer in the underlying
action.

Although

process.

named,

International was never

served

with

[See Amended Complaint in the Packer action attached

hereto as Exhibit B.]
2.

Packer alleged that on October 7, 1988, he purchased four

products from NSI, one of those products being NSI's high foam
degreaser.

Packer further alleged that the high foam degreaser was

packaged in a 7-gallon metal can manufactured by B.W. Norton with
a pour

spout and lid manufactured by defendant International.

[Packer Amended Complaint, para. 7.]
3.

Packer claimed that the metal container contained a metal

pour spout with a lid that indicated that one was to "pry out" the
metal

lid to open the container.

Packer alleged that as he

attempted to do so, the small metal lid suddenly exploded outward,
striking him in the right eye.

[Packer Amended Complaint, paras.

8 and 9.]
4.

Packer then sought recovery from defendants B.W. Norton

and NSI based
negligence.
5.

upon strict liability, breach of warranty, and

[See Packer Amended Complaint generally.]

Defendant

NSI

did

not

defendant B.W. Norton.

207(H7nh
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file

a

cross-claim

against

6.

Defendant B.W. Norton filed a motion for summary judgment

asserting that there was no evidence that the products manufactured
or supplied by B.W, Norton to NSI were defective.

Packer did not

oppose

an

the

motion.

memorandum.

However,

NSI

did

submit

opposition

The trial court, after hearing oral argument and

considering the memoranda, granted B.W. Norton's motion for summary
judgment.
7.

[See Order attached hereto as Exhibit C ]
After

defendant

B.W.

Norton

was

dismissed

from

the

action, defendant NSI settled the case.
8.

Defendant NSI has appealed the trial court's granting of

B.W. Norton's motion for summary judgment in the underlying action.
The appeal is currently in the briefing stage.
INTRODUCTION
In its appeal of the underlying action, defendant NSI is
asserting that the trial court improperly granted B.W. Norton's
motion for summary judgment. Defendant NSI argues that because the
trial court granted B.W. Norton's motion for summary judgment, NSI
was

somehow

responsible

forced

to settle the Packer

for more

than

action and was held

its proportionate

share

of

fault.

However, NSI never filed a cross-claim against B.W. Norton in the
underlying

action.

Had NSI filed a cross-claim against B.W.

Norton, then NSI would have had standing to contest B.W. Norton's
motion for summary judgment.

'O'OUnh

If NSI had filed a cross-claim, and
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the court had granted B.W. Norton's motion for summary judgment,
NSI could have requested that that judgment be certified as final
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

If

the court certified the judgment as final, defendant NSI then would
have been able to seek appellate review of the decision prior to
trial.

If the trial court had denied the Rule 54(b) certification,

then NSI would have been required to take the case to trial.

If

NSI lost at trial, then at that time it would have been free to
appeal the granting of B.W. Norton's motion for summary judgment.
If NSI was successful on appeal, the case would be remanded for a
new trial.

This is the procedure that NSI should have followed in

the underlying action in order to preserve any claims it allegedly
had

against

B.W.

Norton.

However, NSI

did

not

follow

this

procedure.
In the instant action, defendant NSI is merely requesting that
the court permit it to recover from B.W. Norton a portion of the
settlement it paid to Packer in the underlying action.

This is

nothing more than an action for contribution which was expressly
abolished by Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-40. Therefore, NSI's complaint
should be dismissed.

>(P(H7nh
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
NSI'S COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CAUSE OF
ACTION UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.
A.

First Cause of Action (Tort Reform Act, Proportionate Fault)
In its

first cause of action, plaintiff

NSI argues that

defendant B.W. Norton's fault should be determined pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-37 et seq.

Apparently, NSI is arguing that this

court should determine the "percentage" of fault attributable to
B.W. Norton in the underlying Packer action.

However, it is

crystal clear that even if this court were to determine that B.W.
Norton

was

in

some

way

at

fault,

NSI

is

not

entitled

to

contribution from B.W. Norton in respect to the settlement paid to
the plaintiff in the underlying action.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-40

provides:
Section 78-27-40. Amount of Liability Limited
to Proportion of Fault — No Contribution.
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum
amount for which a defendant may be liable to
any person seeking recovery is that percentage
or proportion of the damages equivalent to the
percentage or proportion of fault attributed
to that defendant. No defendant is entitled
to contribution
from any other person.
[Emphasis added]
In the underlying action, defendant NSJ chose to settle the
claims that plaintiff Sherman Packer v/as asserting.
that
>07<H7nh

settlement, NSI

was

not

required
5

to pay

In reaching

more

than

its

proportionate share of fault.

The fact that NSI now believes that

it paid more than its proportionate share of fault in reaching its
settlement with Packer does not operate to somehow give NSI a right
to

contribution

from

B.W.

Norton

when

contribution

has

been

expressly abolished by statute.
B.

Third Cause of Action (Breach of Warranty) and Fourth Cause of
Action (Strict Liability)
In plaintiff's third and fourth causes of action, plaintiff

has alleged breach of warranty and strict liability.

However, it

is clear that the damages sustained by NSI constitute the amount
that

defendant

NSI was required

underlying action.

to pay in settlement

in the

Defendant NSI was not injured or damaged apart

from the amount that it paid in settlement.

Therefore, both these

causes of action seek reimbursement from B.W. Norton for a portion
of the settlement paid by NSI in the underlying action.

As stated

previously, defendant NSI is not entitled to contribution pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-40.
CONCLUSION
Defendant NSI is currently pursuing two avenues in its attempt
to recover from B.W. Norton a portion of the amount that it paid in
settlement of the Packer action.

First, NSI has appealed the

granting of B.W. Norton's motion for summary judgment in the underlying action.
alternative
>(r<H^nh

That appeal is now in the briefing stage.

attempt

to

recover
6

a

portion

of

the

In an

settlement

proceeds, NSI has filed the instant action against B.W. Norton.
The instant action is nothing more than an attempt to recover
contribution from a co-defendant and is thus expressly barred by
Utah

Code Ann. § 78-27-40.

Therefore, defendant

B.W.

Norton

requests that this court grant its motion to dismiss plaintiff's
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.

DATED this

<?J)

day of

0Off^X/x^

, 1995

PAul M. Belnap
'
Robert L. Janicki
Attorneys for Defendant
B.W. Norton Manufacturing Co,

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document was mailed, first-class postage prepaid, this
of

C l-Q4 M

, 1995, to the following:

Todd S. Winegar
Wade S. Winegar
POWELL & LANG
Attorneys for Plaintiff
110 West Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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ADDENDUM 3

Todd S. Winegar, 3 521
Wade S. Winegar, 5561
POWELL & LANG
Attorneys for Plaintiff National
Service Industries, Inc.
110 West Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 364-0412
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
NATIONAL SERVICE,
INDUSTRIES, INC.
National Service Industries
Response to Norton's Motion
to Dismiss

Plaintiff,
vs.

B.W. NORTON MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, INC., a California
corporation; and INTERNATIONAL
MACHINE & TOOL WORKS, INC.,
an Illinois corporation,

Civil No.
Judge:

950900951CV

TIMOTHY R. HANSON

Defendants.

National Service Industries ("NSI") files this memorandum in opposition to defendant
Norton's motion to dismiss NSFs complaint for failure to state a claim.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In considering a motion to dismiss, "The facts of the complaint are to be liberally construed
and the court must consider all the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff" Anderson v. Dean Witter, 841 P2d 742 at 743 (Ut. App. 1992). The
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complaint is to be dismissed only if, construing all facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
there appears to be no set of fact under which plaintiff could recover. Anderson, supra.

Factual Background
A container, manufactured by defendant Norton, was sold to NSI. NSI made no alteration
to Norton's container. NSI filled the container with soap, and sold it to Sherman Packer. Packer,
while following the instructions which were imprinted on the seal before it was sold to NSI, was
struck in the eye with the container's seal, functionally blinding Packer. The container was
pressurized by altitude and temperature changes, not by the soap it contained.

If a more complete

background is desired by the Court, it is attached as Exhibit 1.
The facts stated by defendant Norton are substantially accurate. The critical fact in defendant
Norton's memorandum is fact "5", which states that NSI did not file a cross claim against Norton.
It is accurate that neither defendant filed a cross claim against the other. That fact, and Norton's
memorandum presume, however, without citation to any authority, that cross claims are compulsory,
and are waived if not filed. As detailed below, cross claims are clearly permissive, not compulsory.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant Norton's motion fails for two reasons.
1. It is the wrong motion. The complaint clearly states three causes of action- negligence,
strict liability, and breach of warranty. Norton complains that there was a prior suit involving these
actions and these parties. The proper motion to raise a prior suit is a motion based on "res judicata."
not "failure to state a claim." Norton does not raise res judicata, however, presumably because it
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must acknowledge that res judicata does not apply here since the issues were never "fully and fairy
litigated," as res judicata requires.
2. Defendant Norton's entire argument hinges on cross claims being compulsory. U.R.C.P.
13(f), and also the comentators, make clear that cross claims are permissive. Since cross claims are
permissive, there is no waiver of a cross claim for declining to file it.

POINT I:

RES JUDICATA IS THE BODY OF LAW THAT DECIDES IF A PRIOR
LAWSUIT BARS A SUBSEQUENT ACTION

Norton has not raised res judicata and so its details need not be reviewed. Suffice it to say
that there is a large body of law, under res judicata, that prevents duplicate litigation. Norton's main
arguement is that it received summary judgment in a previous suit where the same accident was at
issue. Norton attaches its summary judgment to its memorandum. The summary judgment deals
with the claims of Sherman Packer, not NSI. Norton's claim that the previous summary judgment
should affect this suit is governed by the law of res judicata. Norton ignores that body of law
becuase it does not support dismisal.
POINT II. CROSS CLAIMS BETWEEN DEFENDANTS ARE NOT COMPULSORY.
A. Norton's Claim.
Norton cites as fact number 5, "Defendant NSI did not file a cross claim against defendant
B.W. Norton." It is accurate that neither defendant filed a cross claim against the other. Norton's
entire argument presumes, without citation to any authority, that cross claims are compulsory and
that failing to file the 'compulsory' cross claim means the cross claim can not be brought later.
B. Cross claims are clearly permissive.
3

Cross claims are clearly permissive, not compullsory. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 13(f)
governs "Cross-claim against co-party." It states "A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim
by one party against a co-party . . . such cross-claim may include a claim that the party against whom
it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action
against the cross claimant" (emphasis added). The rule clearly states that cross claims "may" be
brought. This rule contrasts with rule 13(a) which is entitled "Compulsory counterclaims", which
uses the word "shall" instead of "may".
Moore's Federal Practice (the Federal and State rules on cross clafrns are the same) states
"The subdivision [on cross claims], though reading much like subdivision (a) concerning
compulsory counterclaim, is permissive: the claim may, but need not, be pleaded." Moore's Federal
Practice §13.34[1]. (Emphasis in original). Since a cross claim is permissive, it is not waived if not
filed in the original suit.
C. Norton Argues That NSI Has No Current Claim Since It Did Not File A Cross Claim.
Nortons' argument hinges on cross claims being compulsory. It is certain, that at some
point, Norton's fault must be determined. Norton claims that the only time, regarding this accident,
that Norton's fault could have been determined, is by NSI filing a cross claim in the first suit.
1. Norton argues that since NSI did not file a cross claim in the first suit, NSI had
no standing to oppose Norton's original motion for summary judgment against Packer, nor standing
to appeal the grant of summary judgment. This is Norton's position on the appeal.
2. Norton argues that the present suit does not state a claim.
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3. Norton claims that, since no cross claim was filed in the first suit, Norton's fault
can never be determined, and no court can now make Norton pay its proportionate share of fault.

D. Norton's Compulsory Cross Claim Theory Leads To Absurd Results.
(1) It shifts the burden of proof and allows a plaintiff to "dismiss" a defendant.
Consider the following example, which, NSI maintains, substantially occurred between the
present parties. A plaintiff sues three defendants, each of which, for argument sake, is one-third
liable for plaintiffs injury. Plaintiff serves two of the defendants, but finds service on the third
difficult so decides not to serve the third.
The plaintiff decides that the case against one of the two defendants it has served is easier
to make than the case against the other. This could be for a number of reasons: one defendant has
a better witness; a deeper pocket; less aggressive counsel; more complete records; a deceased
witness, etc.
Plaintiff, under Norton's theory, merely targets one defendant and allows the other defendant
to move for summary judgment. Plaintiff does not resist the motion for summary judgment. The
Court, faced with an unresisted motion, would almost certainly grant it. Norton maintains that since
the co-defendants had not filed permissive cross claims, they could not resist the other codefendant's motion.
The plaintiff effectively dismisses one defendant, and forces the remaining defendants to pay
the dismissed defendants share of fault (since the dismissed defendant's fault is not determined by
the jury.)

The same inequity results if the case is settle. The plaintiff, who can go to trial and
5

receive all of the dismissed defendants damages, will require those damages to settle. The likely
result is the remaining defendant, who is only one third liable, would pay the dismissed defendants
share of damages.
Norton claims the court is helpless to remedy this situation, because the remaining defendant,
here NSI, brought this dilemma on itself by failing to file a permissive cross claim.
(2) Norton's argument that cross claims should be compulsory does not remedy the situation.
Norton's desire to make cross claims 'compulsory' does not remedy the situation. In
Norton's introduction on page 3, it begins five statements with "if." Norton's scenario is that " i f
a cross claim had been filed, Rule 54(b) certification would possibly have given NSI an appeal on
which it had standing to appeal. If not, " . . . then NSI would have been required to take the case to
trial." Norton's memorandum, page 4 (emphasis added). Under Norton's theory, settlement waives
the defendant's claims under these circumstances. After a string of "if s" Norton identifies NSI's
final remedy would then be a second trial. Norton's theory is not only legally unsupported, but
unworkable.
(3) Norton's claim that failure to file a permissive cross claim leaves the co-defendant
without remedy, violates constitution rights.
Norton has cited no law that cross claims are compulsory and has cited no reasons that
'compulsory' cross claims would be either fair or efficient. Additionally, Norton's claim of no
remedy, if followed by this court, would result in the deprivation of constitutional rights, including
a denial of due process (United States Constitution, 5th amendment; Utah Constitution, Article 1,
Section 7), and the open courts provision in Article 1, section 11 of the Utah Constitution.
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"The open courts provision guarantees 'access to the courts and a judicial procedure that is
based on fairness and equality,' and prevents arbitrary deprivation of 'effective remedies designed
to protect basic individual rights."' Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, at (Ut. App. 1993) quoting
Berry ex rel Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P2d 670, (Ut. 1985).
"Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are the very
heart of procedural fairness." Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983). Norton's fault
must be determined, and the right to have it determined cannot be waived by failing to file a
permissive cross claim. Under the circumstances of this case, Norton's proportionate fault needs
to be determined here, or due process and the open courts provision are violated.

E. SUMMARY
Norton argues that its unresisted motion for summary judgment in the first suit cannot be
contested or appealed by a co-defendant. Norton argues here that a co-defendant has no claim in the
present court, having failed to file a permissive cross claim in the first. In short, failure to take a
permissive action, results in deprivation of any possible remedy. Norton's arguments presumably
mean that International, who was never served by plaintiff in the first suit, can never be sued also.
Such an interpretation, if adopted, would violate constitutional principles. The solution to this false
dilemma created by Norton is obvious. U.R.C.P. 13(f) clearly makes cross-claims permissive, not
mandatory. Nothing was waived by not bringing the cross-claim in the first suit. Principles of res
judicata, neither raised nor applicable here, will prevent unnecessary re-litigation of the same issues.
In this case, there is yet to be litigation of the cases issues.
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POINT II: THE TORT REFORM ACT CLEARLY CREATES A CAUSE OF ACTION
TO HAVE A PARTY'S PROPORTIONATE FAULT DETERMINED.
The Tort Reform Act defines in U.C.A.78-27-37, that '"Persons seeking recovery' means
any person seeking damages or reimbursement on its own behalf . . . ."

NSI is seeking

"reimbursement on its own behalf as specifically authorized by the statute. That phrase has been
interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court, in Sullivan v. Scoular Grain, 853 P2d 877 at 881 (Utah
1993), to include employers and their insurance carriers, under the Worker's Compensation Act, as
such persons seeking "reimbursement". Likewise, NSI is seeking reimbursement, as the act
specifically authorizes.
Norton is clearly a defendant under the act. Section 78-27-37 states "defendant" means a
person, ". . . who is claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery." The
complaint makes clear the claim that Norton is liable.
The act also makes clear that any defendant can be joined by any other party to the litigation.
Section 78-27-41 states "Joinder of Defendants. (1) a person seeking recovery, or any defendant
who is a party to the litigation, may join as a defendant,. . . any person . . . who may have caused
or contributed to the injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the purpose of having
determined their respective proportions of fault."
The statute is clear. It specifically authorizes NSI, as plaintiff, to be reimbursed by Norton,
as defendant, for Norton's proportionate fault. The statute's very purpose is " . . . to ensure that 'no
defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault
attributable to that defendant'" Sullivan, supra, at 880 (quoting Utah Code Ann. §78-27-38).
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Norton's claim that the courts are now powerless to determine Norton's proportionate fault, because
NSI did not file a permissive counterclaim in the first suit, abrogates the statute's purpose.
Norton tries to construe the complaint as seeking contribution, a cause of action under the
prior statute. The complaint never requests contribution. Instead it specifically cites the Tort
Reform Statute, and specifically requests that Norton's proportion of fault be determined. The
current statute has replace contribution, and that statute has been followed. The complaint states
a claim.
POINT III:

NSPS COMPLAINT ALSO STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
INDEMNIFICATION AGAINST NORTON.

Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft, 758 P2d 443 (Ut. App. 1988), held that, under certain
circumstances, a upstream manufacturer in a strict liability case, must indemnify the downstream
distributor not only for a judgment or settlement, but also attorney's fees and costs. Here, Norton
manufactured the container, and included in its product, as delivered to NSI, the sharp-edged seal
which struck Mr. Packer's eye. NSI made no alteration of the seal. NSI received the container,
including the seal, put liquid in the container, precisely as intended by Norton and sold the container
to Mr. Packer. The Complaint states a claim for indemnification. The breach of Warranty claim
is similar.
POINT IV: THE PENDING APPEAL TREATS DIFFERENT ISSUES
Defendant Norton implies that the appellate court will answer the questions in this case. That
is not accurate. While the appeal deals with some of the same arguments, the appeal treats whether
a codefendant can argue against a motion for summary judgment between plaintiff and another
defendant and whether a defendant's fault should be on the verdict form if the plaintiff does not put
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up a good faith resistance to the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Neither of those
questions are before this Court.
The question before this Court is whether cross claims are compulsory, and if not brought
in a lawsuit between co-defendants are forever waived. The answer to that is clear. The rules of
civil procedure, both federal and Utah, have never made cross claims compulsory and there are a
host of reasons for them not being compulsory. Usually, issues of cross claims are resolved in the
first suit. They would have been resolved in this case had the plaintiff resisted the motion for
summary judgment. Under unusual circumstances, as here, the statue specifically allows a suit for
reimbursement, and to have the defendants proportionate fault determined. The complaint states a
claim.
Respectfully Submitted, this/vf

POWELL & LANG, LC
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day of May, 1995.

Exhibit 1
Factual Background
Sherman Packer was injured when the seal of a container manufactured by defendant Norton
exploded into his eye, functionally blinding the eye. The seal was imprinted with the instruction"pry
out." Plaintiff was following that instruction, and began prying the seal, when it exploded. The
container was pressurized by altitude and temperature changes- not by NSI's soap which it
contained. Packer sued NSI (manufacturer of the soap in Norton's container); Norton, who
manufactured the container; and International who manufactured the seal which Norton incorporated
into its container.
International was never served by Packer. Norton moved for summary judgment against
Packer and Packer's counsel stated he would oppose the summary judgment, and obtained an
extension to respond. As the extension expired, counsel for Packer decided he would not oppose the
summary judgment since Packard's counsel did not care whether Norton was a defendant or not, as
long as Norton's fault could not be determined by the jury. Although plaintiffs counsel indicated
that he did not respond because he thought Norton's motion had merit (R. p. 20,1. 8-10, p. 21,1. 1213) he also frankly acknowledged that the procedural posture did not hurt him. "Frankly, it doesn't
matter to me. It literally doesn't matter to me. That's why I didn't file a response . . . it literally
doesn't make any difference to me if it is both of these defendants at trial or one." (R. p. 21,1. 1015) "I could have made an opposition, and maybe the outcome would be different." (R. p. 20,1. 4)
Out of caution, NSI filed an opposing memorandum, within a few days, against the co-defendant.
NSI argued that:
1. NSI was not obligated to resist the motion between the plaintiff and a co-defendant;
2. That NSI did not object to the motion for summary judgment being granted, as long as
Norton's fault was determined by the jury;
3. That Norton's fault should be determined by the jury since the case was distinguishable
from Sullivan v. Scoular Grain, 853 P.2d 877, in that plaintiff declined to resist the summary
judgment motion. Without good faith resistance, Norton should be granted summary judgment on
a procedural basis and not because of a "lack of fault" described in Sullivan.
At the summary judgment hearing, the court in the first suit indicated that it was inclined to
rule that summary judgment be granted, and NSI's brief ignored since the brief had not been filed
within the time limits set by the rules. The Court reconsidered its advisory ruling and heard
argument on the merits when Packard's counsel acknowledged that he had intended to file an
opposing memorandum, and decided not to at the last minute. NSI twice requested additional time
to respond to the motion.
The Court ruled that Norton did not have a duty towards the plaintiff as it was merely a
"component part manufacturer" and that there was no issue of fact as to Norton's fault.
During one of several court ordered settlement conferences, which Norton did not attend
because it had obtained summary judgment, the case was settled. Packer refused to settle for less
than the full value of the case, and stated he had been fully compensated in the release. Packer
maintained that he had not resisted Norton's motion for summary judgment, and that any appeal
would have to be on the part of NSI. Packer agreed that he would cooperate in pursuing the case,
at NSI's expense, against the other two defendants.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the
of May, 1995, a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing was hand delivered, to the following:

Paul M. Belnap
Robert L. Janicki
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant B.W. Norton Manufacturing
Sixth Floor Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

